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A CASE STUDY  OF INVESTMENT  IN ORANGE  GROVES
Charles B. Moss,  Ronald P. Muraro, and William G. Boggess
Abstract  budget  deficits  mounted.  With  the  Tax  Eq-
The  1980s have been  a period  of dramatic  uity  and  Fiscal  Responsibility  Act  of  1982
change for the income  tax code in the United  (TEFRA)  (U.S.  Congress,  1982),  some  tax
States. Although numerous modifications were  breaks granted in ERTA were modified. Most
considered  in  policy  deliberations,  two  key  notably,  the amount of investment tax credit
goals, the reduction  of the importance  of tax  (ITC)  allowed,  the  basis  for  depreciable  as-
considerations in investment decisions and tax  sets, and  the amount  of capital expenditures
simplification,  emerged  from  the  discussion  that  could  be  expensed  were  all  reduced.
and guided drafting of the  1986  Tax Reform  However, the essence  of the ERTA was pre-
Act.  This study  examines  the  importance  of  served  The tax code continued to favor capi-
tax  considerations  in  investment  decisions  tal formation via the Accelerated  Cost Recov-
ery System  ITC, and  a 60-percent  reduction under the provisions  of the  Tax Reform Act  ery System,  ITC, and a 60-percent  reduction
of 1986 and its  predecessor,  the Tax  Equity  in the marginal tax rate for capital gains. The
and  Fiscal  Responsibility  Act  of  1982.  The  tax system recently underwent  another, pos-
study then  compares  the  tax liability  under  sibly  more  dramatic,  revision  with  the  Tax
these  tax  codes  with a  nondistortionary  tax  Reform Act of 1986  (TRA) (Commerce  Clear-
scheme. Results indicate that the Tax Reform  ing House, Inc.). This act, among other things,
Act of 1986 reduced the distortionary  effects  drastically  reduced the number of tax brack-
of the  tax  code  on  capital  investment  deci-  ets andthe allowable  deductions fromadusted
sions.  However,  a large  portion of the reduc-  gross  income.  It  also  eliminated  preferential
tion  can  be  attributed  to  the  change  in  the  capital gains treatment and ITC.
~average tax  rate~~.  ~These  changes in the federal income tax code
could  have major impacts  on the profitability
Keywords:  investment,  Tax  Reform  Act,  and  structure  of  agriculture  in  the  United
Tax Equity and  Fiscal  Respon-  States. Since the end of the second world war,
sibility Act, tax distortions.  U.S.  agriculture  has  become  increasingly
mechanized.  This  increased  mechanization
D.ramatic changes  in the income tax code  typically gives rise to assets with finite useful
have  occurred  in  the  United  States  in  the  lives  which  are  expensed  (i.e.,  depreciated)
1980s. In  1981, the Kemp-Roth Economic Re-  against income  over the productive  life of the
covery Tax Act (ERTA) (U.S. Congress,  1981)  asset.  Hence,  the increased  mechanization  in
reduced the number of tax brackets,  acceler-  agriculture  has left the sector more  sensitive
ated depreciation allowances, changed invest-  to changes in cost recovery or depreciation al-
ment  tax  credit,  changed  capital  expensing,  lowances  and  ITC  in  the  federal  income  tax
and made numerous other adjustments to the  code. Also,  since  a large portion of the assets
U.S. income  tax code.  By  1982 the mood had  in the sector are real estate, recent changes in
shifted  to  fiscal  responsibility  as  federal  the tax rate for capital gains could also signifi-
'Technically,  TEFRA allowed the taxpayer to either reduce  the depreciable basis of the asset by half of the ITC claimed, or to reduce
the amount of ITC to 8 percent. For the purpose of this study,  we assume that the  decision maker chooses to reduce the amount of ITC
claimed.
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107cantly  affect  U.S.  agriculture.  Specifically,  a  Unfortunately,  the resulting  distortion  of in-
higher marginal tax rate on capital gains could  vestment decisions  may lead to  misallocation
reduce  agricultural  real  estate  prices  which  of resources between industries, misallocation
would decrease net worth in the farm sector.  of labor versus  capital,  and  undesirable  dis-
The  agricultural  economics  profession  has  tributional  effects  across  income  brackets.
been quick to embrace research on the effects  Hence,  this  section  develops  a  theoretical
of tax policy  on individual  producers, as well  model  to measure  the  effect  of these  distor-
as  on the  sector  as a whole  (Durst).  Most  of  tions on the economic  value  of capital invest-
the work has  centered  around implications  of  ments.
tax  considerations,  such  as  capital gains  ex-  The theoretical model  is a discrete  form  of
elusions, investment tax credit, capital expens-  Samuelson's  continuous  model.  Samuelson
ing (Sec.  179 or additional first-year deprecia-  developed  a depreciation  stream  for a capital
tion),  and  depreciation  (Chisholm,  Kay  and  investment  such that  the  economic  value  of
Rister, Lynne). These studies suggest that tax  the investment is independent of the tax rate.
considerations  are a significant factor in agri-  He proposes the following general theorem:
cultural  financial decisions.  In fact some have
labeled  the  tax  code  the  "silent  farm  bill,"  Fundamentaltheoremoftax-rate  nvariance (Senator Thomas  Daschle in the Washington  If, and  only if, the true loss of economic value (Senator Thomas  Daschle  in the Washington  . p  . a t  dpea
Post, 14 October  1985) whose benefits appear  i  permitted  as  a tax-deductible  depreciation
to  be  skewed  to  the  high-income  investor  expense  will  the  present  value  of  a  cash- to  be  skewed  to  the  high-income  investor 
(Hanson and Bertelson, Hanson and Eidman).2 receipt  stream be independent  of the  rate of
This  study  examines  how income  tax  code  tax (Samuelson, p. 604).
provisions  for  depreciation,  investment  tax  A discrete version  of Samuelson's  theorem is
credit,  and  capital gains exclusions distort in-  developed  along with a method for empirically
vestment decisions. The relative distortionary  deriving  the distortion in investment profita-
effects  on  the investment  decisions  are then  bility arising from the tax code.
compared for the 1982 and 1986 legislation us-  The present  value  of an investment  in pe-
ing an empirical version of Samuelson's model  riod t, given average tax rate3 T, is:
of a nondistortionary tax policy.
In the following  section,  Samuelson's  deri-  [Nj - T  (Nj -Dj)]
vation of  a nondistortionary  tax  policy is  ex-  ()  V (T) - Dj 
amined,  and  a  procedure  for  measuring  the  j=t  n (1+ ik  (1- T))
distortion of tax policies on the profitability of  k=t
an investment is developed. This technique is  where Nt is the cash flow from the investment
then applied to a hypothetical investment in a  in period t, ik  is the discount rate in period t,
Florida  orange  grove to  determine  the  rela-  and  Dt is depreciation  allowance  in period  t.
tive importance  of income  tax  considerations  The numerator of equation (1) is after-tax cash
under the 1982 and 1986 tax codes as amended  flow  in each period t. Appendix  1 shows  that
by the Technical  and  Miscellaneous  Revenue  equation (1) can be rewritten expressing Vt(T)
Act of 1988.  Results are then presented that  as a function of its own first difference:
indicate that the distortionary  effects, though
still  significant,  declined  under  the  TRA  of  1
1986.  (2)  V,(T)=  [i  (1  - T)]
A NON-DISTORTIONARY  TAX POLICY  *  Vt  (T)+  Nt1 - T  (Nt_  -Dt  )
This study is primarily interested  in deter-  The present  value  of  an  asset in  period  t  is
mining  the  effect  of the  change  in  deprecia-  thus a function  of the change  in the  value of
tion allowance,  investment  tax credit,  capital  the asset in the preceding  period AV  (T)  and
gains  exclusions,  and tax rates  on investment  the  cash  flow  generated  in  the  preceding
in  orange  groves. These  tax provisions  were  period (N  -Te(N  -Dt 1)).
designed  to  stimulate  business  investment. 
2The argument that the  current tax policies may encourage  firm growth is not unanimous. Davenport  et al. cite  a study that provides
evidence that the current tax structure may retard firm growth.
3Some  arguments  for the use of marginal  tax rates  over the average  tax rates  exist. For  example,  the effect  of firm wealth on the
marginal  unit  of investment  is the marginal  tax rate.  However,  the average  tax rate  embraces  more  aspects  of the  change  in  tax
legislation. In addition, it is probably more consistent with the spirit of Samuelson's  model.
108Using the  relationship in  equation  (2),  Ap-  permitting for water and land use. Trees are
pendix 2 shows that the tax invariant sequence  assumed  to be planted  in  year two  of the in-
of depreciation charges becomes:  vestment.  Total  trees  planted per net  grove
(3) Dt =- [it  Vt+ - Nt  / (l+it),  acre is  140 with an  annual tree  attrition rate
or  [i  V 1 N^  " (  of three trees per acre.  Oranges are assumed
(4or  D=  AtT)  At(to  be marketed on tree for $5/box in each year.5
(4) D= - AV t (T) = - AV  ()  . For further  detail  on  the  physical  layout  of
To obtain this result, Samuelson  notes that if  the  orange  grove  or  the  fixed  and  variable
the  economic  value  of the  investment  is  in-  costs see Muraro and Fairchild.
variant to tax considerations,  then Vt(T) for a
general  average  tax rate, T,  must equal Vt(O)  EFFECT OF TAX LEGISLATION ON
or the case of a zero average  tax rate by con-  INVESTMENT IN ORANGE  GROVES
struction.4 This result also implies that AVt(T)  From an orange producer's perspective, the
must  equal AVt(0)  or  the theorem  would  not  1986 TRA had four major consequences. First,
hold at every point in time. Thus, the present  the TRA made  major changes  in the tax rate
value  of an investment  in a nondistortionary  schedules.  Second,  capital  gains  deductions
tax policy would, by definition, equal the pres-  were eliminated. Third, the TRA removed the
ent value  of the  same investment  under any  investment  tax  credit.  These  three  changes
tax  policy  with an  average  tax rate of zero.  have  broad  implications  for agriculture  as  a
Hence, the distortionary  effect of a given tax  whole, and they are important considerations
regime  on  a particular  investment,  given  an  for  most  Florida  producers.  The  final  effect
average tax rate, is simply the difference be-  which is more specific to Florida orange groves
tween the present value of the investment  at  reclassifies  orange  groves  from  five-year
a zero tax  rate  and the  present  value  of the  ACRS  property to  10-year straightline  prop-
investment considering taxes.  erty for depreciation purposes (U.S. Congress,
A  depreciation  allowance  structured  as  in  1988).
equation  (4)  would  produce  identical  invest-  The effect  of these changes  in the tax code
ment  decisions  for  producers  regardless  of  on orange grove investments can be computed
their average  income  tax rate. Thus, this tax  by measuring  the difference  in  the economic
code  would remove the impetus to "farm the  profitability  of the investment with and with-
tax code." Investments would be made on the  out taxes, divided by the present value of the
basis  of their  economic  value implied  by  the  investment without taxes. Thus, it is possible
market.  Such  a  tax  policy  would  be  scale  to determine empiricallywhether the change in
neutral.  Further, it would remove  tendencies  tax policy  actually reduced the importance  of
to overinvest  in  intermediate  assets  because  tax considerations in the investment decision.
of tax considerations.  Therefore,  such a code  In addition,  results calculated  using equation
could  reduce  the  possibility  of  the  financial  (4)  will allow  comparison  of the  actual taxes
stress in agriculture observed in the early and  paid under each tax policy with the taxes paid
mid 1980s.  under the Samuelson tax invariant policy.
DATA
The tax results for this  study are based on  DISTORTIONARY  EFFECTS OF
a case  study  of Hamlin  oranges  in  southern  TAX CODE CHANGES  ON
Florida.  The  results  represent  the  cost  and  INVESTMENT  DECISIONS
returns from the establishment and operation  The TRA changed both the tax rate, depre-
of a grove of Hamlin oranges  over  a 25-year  ciation,  and  investment  tax  credit,  and  the
period. The Hamlin grove investment includes  capital gains provisions.  While it is useful  to
the cost of the land, land preparation,  and mi-  know the net effect of the tax code changes on
crosprinkler  irrigation.  The cumulative  costs  the  distortion  of investment  decisions  under
for the first five  years represent  the capital-  the TRA, it is also useful to know the contri-
ized  costs for the  grove investment  (i.e., cost  bution  of  each  component.  In  other  words,
of land  preparation,  cost  of planting and  car-  what is the effect of the change in the average
ing for the citrus trees through the fourth year  tax  rate  relative  to  the  change  in  deprecia-
after planting). Year one is assumed to be de-  tion, investment tax credit, and  capital exclu-
voted  to  land  preparation  and  government  sion on the investment decision?
4Note that the tax flow in the numerator and the after-tax discount rate both change  as the average tax rate changes.
O50n-tree price equals farm-gate price net of picking and hauling costs of harvested fruit.
109The  problem  then  is  to  determine  what  distortion for a family with combined  income
portion  of the change  in  investment  decision  of  $20,000  under  the  TEFRA  code  at  the
is due to changes  in the average tax rate ver-  TEFRA rate was 90.0 percent  and under the
sus  changes  in  tax  depreciation  allowances,  TRA rate 87.7 percent.  Thus, the reduction in
investment tax credit, and capital gains exclu-  tax  distortion  resulting  from  the  decline  in
sion.  In  order  to do  this,one  of the  factors  average  tax  rates  was only  2.3  percent  at a
has to be held constant while the other varies.  $20,000  income compared to 46.4 percent  at a
This study will value the  change in deprecia-  $200,000 income.
tion  allowances,  investment  tax  credit,  and  The higher the average tax rate, the greater
capital gains exclusion  while  maintaining the  the distortionary effect of any tax policy which
TRA  average  tax  rates.  The  effect  of  the  deviates  from the  Samuelson  model.  Thus,  a
change in tax rates will be calculated  holding  large part of Congress'  goal to reduce the dis-
the TEFRA tax preferences constant. Hence,  tortionary effect of taxes  on investment  deci-
the  results  may  tend  to  overestimate  the  sions can be accomplished  simply by decreas-
effect of the changes in tax rates and underes-  ing the  average  tax rate.  If the  current tax
timate the  effect  of the  change  in  deprecia-  depreciation  schedules  and other preferences
tion, investment  tax credit, and  capital gains  in the code deviate from the nondistortionary
exclusion.6 depreciation  schedules, the only way to elimi-
nate  the tax  distortion  is  to set the  average
Effect of the Change in  tax rate to zero. Thus, to examine whether or
Average Tax Rates  not  the  tax code  has  become  less  distortion-
The results in Table  1 indicate that the dis-  ary without confusing the effect of changes in
tortionary  effects  of the  tax  code  on  the  in-  the tax rates, the average tax rate is held con-
vestment  decision  increase  as  tax  rates  in-  stant  and  the  distortionary  effects  due  to
crease.  The percentage  increase  in net pres-  changes in depreciation, investment tax credit,
ent value for the orange grove attributable to  and capital gains exclusions are determined.
tax considerations  reaches  a high  of 202  per-
cent  of the  net  present  value  without  taxes  Effect of Changes in Depreciation,
for trees, irrigation,  and land preparation un-  Investment Tax Credit,
der TEFRA.  It is apparent by moving  down  and Capial Gains Exclusion
the tax scale  that a large  portion  of this  dis-  The  change in distortion  of the investment
tortion is attributable  to the tax rate. For ex-  decision attributable  to changes  in deprecia-
ample, the gain due  to tax considerations  un-  tion, investment  tax credit, and  capital gains
der TEFRA  falls to  168 percent if family  in-  provisions  indicates that the TRA is less dis-
come declines  to $100,000.  Applying the aver-  tortionary  than  TEFRA.  However,  the  dis-
age tax rate under TRA to the tax allowances  tortionary effects  of the TRA are still signifi-
under TEFRA confirms this suspicion. A fam-  cant. For example, Table 1 indicates that for a
ily with annual income of $200,000 experienced  family  with income  of $200,000,  the TRA tax
a 46  (i.e.,  202  - 156)  percent  reduction  in the  provisions  result  in  a  13-percent  increase  in
net  present  value  resulting from  the decline  the net present value of an investment in trees,
in tax rates under the TRA.  irrigation, and land preparation.
The  portion  of the  tax  distortion  attribut-  The distortionary  effects  of the changes  in
able  to the change  in  average  tax rate is  an  depreciation,  investment tax credit,  and capi-
increasing function of taxable income because  tal gains provisions are also an increasing func-
the TRA legislated larger declines in average  tion of income.  However, the distortionary ef-
tax rates for higher taxable incomes.  For ex-  feet  of these  changes  is  less  sensitive  to in-
ample,  a  family  with  a  combined  income  of  come  levels  than is  the  effect  of changes  in
$20,000 received  only a 0.6 percent  decline in  average  tax rates. For a family with total in-
their  average  tax  rate  under  TRA,  while  a  come  of $20,000,  the  distortionary  effect  on
family  with combined  income  of $200,000  re-  the net present  value  of an investment in an
ceived  an  11.4-percent  decline  in their aver-  orange  grove fell  from  88  percent  under the
age tax rate (Hanson and Bertelson).  The tax  TEFRA preferences to  74 percent  under the
6Assuming that the TEFRA  tax codes were more distortionary  than  the TRA tax codes, any change  in average tax rate would result
in a larger change in distortion ceteris paribus. This phenomenon  is similar to the use of a Laspereyes index to measure inflation.
7The  average  tax  rates  in  Hanson  and  Bertelson  include  adjustments  for  the change  in  zero  bracket  amounts,  the  effect  of tax
surcharges,  and changes in self-employment taxes.
110TRA  preferences.  For  a  family  income  of  tax credit,  and capital gains  exclusion.  How-
$200,000, the  distortion  fell from  156 percent  ever, for families with incomes of $100,000  or
to 131 percent.  greater,  the  effect  of the  change  in  average
tax rate is greater than the effect of the change
Total Effect of the Change  in tax preferences.
in Tax Code  These results have  implications for the dis-
It  is  technically  incorrect  to  compare  the  tributional  effects  of the TRA.  If the change
relative  change  in  investment  decisions  be-  in distortion arises primarily from the change
tween the change in average tax rate and the  in the average  tax rate for higher income lev-
change in depreciation allowances, investment  els, then the primary effect of TRA may be to
tax credit,  and  capital gains  exemption.  Un-  decrease taxes paid by higher income taxpay-
der Samuelson's  tax invariance  principle,  any  ers. Thus, the  differential reductions  in aver-
tax rate could  be nondistortionary  depending  age tax rates under TRA may be interpreted
on the depreciation  schedule.  However, given  as  favoring  higher  income  producers.  How-
that the tax considerations  distort the invest-  ever,  the  distortion  due  to  depreciation,  in-
ment decision, a higher average tax rate leads  vestment tax  credit,  and  capital gains  exclu-
to greater  distortion.  Thus,  the  average  tax  sion also declined, holding the average tax rate
rate is  a multiplier  for any  distortion  in  in-  constant. Therefore, the TRA also took a step
vestment considerations  arising from tax con-  toward a nondistortionary tax policy.
siderations.
At lower levels of income,  changes in depre-  COMPARISON OF TAXES  PAID
ciation  allowances,  investment  tax  credit,  THROUGH TIME
and capital gains exclusions  are the most sig-  In the  preceding  section, the  distortionary
nificant  component  of  distortion.  If  family  effects of the tax code were evaluated in terms
income is $10,000, the change in distortion due  of the net present values  of an investment  in
to the change in tax preferences  is 12 percent  an  orange  grove.  However,  additional  infor-
versus  the  change  in  distortion  due  to  the  mation may be obtained by looking at the dis-
change  in  average  tax rate  of 1 percent.  At  tortionary  effect  of the tax  codes  over  time.
the $50,000 level, the change in distortion due  This section presents taxes paid in each year
to the  average  tax rate  is  5  percent  versus  on an acre  of oranges under two  income  lev-
a change due to tax preferences of 19 percent.  els, and for TEFRA, TRA, and nondistortion-
Hence,  the  change  in  distortion  for  lower  ary tax scenarios.
income  levels  is  primarily  attributable  to  Figure 1 shows the taxes paid per acre un-
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Tax  Assumptions  --  TEFRA  Tax Rate and  Depreciation  Figure 1.  Taxes Paid Per Acre
-- TRA  Tax Rate and Depreciation  With Family Income
*  TRA Tax Rate,  Samuelson Depreciation  of $50,000.
111TABLE  1:  PERCENTAGE  CHANGE  IN NET PRESENT VALUE  OF  INVESTMENT  IN AN ORANGE  GROVE
ATTRIBUTABLE  TO TAX CONSIDERATIONS
Average  Tax Ratea  TEFRA  Tax Provisionsb
TRA Tax
TEFRA  TRA  TEFRA Tax  TRA Tax  Provisions
Income  Rates  Rates  and  Rates
$  ……——  - percent  -…——  —  —  —
Trees  Onlyc
10,000  7.7  7.5  39  39  32
20,000  11.9  11.3  47  46  39
50,000  21.5  20.3  67  64  54
100,000  31.4  25.5  88  75  63
200,000  40.0  28.6  106  82  68
Trees,  Irrigation, and  Land Preparationd
10,000  7.7  7.5  74  73  61
20,000  11.9  11.3  90  88  74
50,000  21.5  20.3  128  123  104
100,000  31.4  25.5  168  144  121
200,000  40.0  28.6  202  156  131
Trees,  Irrigation, Land Preparation, and  Lande
10,000  7.7  7.5  271  269  225
20,000  11.9  11.3  330  321  271
50,000  21.5  20.3  467  450  379
100,000  31.4  25.5  614  526  442
200,000  40.0  28.6  742  572  478
a  Source: Hanson and Bertelsen.
b  Tax Provisions  are  defined  for the  purpose  of this table  as  depreciation,  investment  tax credit,  and
capital gains exclusion.
e The present value of the cash flows arising from the trees alone.
d  The present value of the cash flows arising from the trees, the irrigation system, and land preparation.
e The present  value of the cash flows arising from the trees, the irrigation system,  land preparation,  and
changes in land values.
112come from all sources, both farm and off farm,  year six to year 17, however, the difference  is
of $50,000.  A negative  taxes  paid number in-  the  result of the change  in  tax rate and the
dicates that the investment  is generating tax  change  from  five-year  ACRS  to  10-year
savings in either tax credits or deductions that  straightline depreciation.
can be used to offset other income.  The figure  Taxes  paid  under  TEFRA  and  TRA  have
indicates that planting an orange grove yields  similar patterns through time: tax advantages
tax savings through year seven under TEFRA  in  early  years  with  tax  disadvantages  in
and year six under TRA.  The large  tax sav-  latter  years.  Both  tax  codes  are  markedly
ings in year six under TEFRA is due primar-  different  from  the  tax  liability  under  the
ily to investment tax credit, since  recognition  Samuelson  or  tax-invariant  depreciation
of investment  tax  credit  is delayed  until the  scheme.  Under  the  Samuelson  depreciation,
investment yields positive cash flow. Further,  the initial period offers a large tax advantage.
while  both TEFRA  and TRA  yield  tax  sav-  However, the taxes paid per acre become posi-
ings in early years, TEFRA yields the largest  tive in year two and remain positive through-
tax savings.  out the life of the asset. The increase in taxes
During the productive phase, after the trees  paid per acre  until year 10 is due  to the fact
begin to yield  sufficient  oranges  to meet an-  that an orange  grove increases in  value until
nual cost, taxes paid under TRA exceed taxes  the average age of a tree in the grove reaches
paid under TEFRA for four years. After the  11 years. Note that the major deviation of TRA
fourth year, however, taxes paid per acre un-  and TEFRA from the tax invariant deprecia-
der  TEFRA  exceed taxes  paid under  TRA.  tion  occurs  early  in the  grove's  life.  There-
This  divergence  is  due  to  two  changes,  the  fore, the higher the discount rate, the greater
change in average  tax rate and the change  in  the distortion.
depreciation  schedules.  From year  17 to the  Figure  2 presents the  taxes  paid  per acre
end  of the  investment,  income  is taxed  at a  for a family  with  annual income  of $200,000.
higher rate under TEFRA, and the deprecia-  The  overall  patterns  for  the  higher  income
tion expense with 10-year straightline  ends in  family  are consistent with the taxes paid per
year 16. Thus, over this time period, taxes paid  acre  with  a  family  income  of $50,000.  How-
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Tax Assumptions  -o  TEFRA  Tax Rate and Depreciation  Figure 2.  Taxes Paid Per Acre
'  TRA Tax  Rate and Depreciation  With Family Income
*  TRA Tax  Rate, Samuelson  Depreciation  of $200,000.
113relatively  higher  for  family  incomes  of  ary  effect  of tax  policies  on  the  investment
$200,000,  the  separation  between  the  taxes  decision  under  both  the  TEFRA  and  TRA
paid  under  TRA  and  TEFRA  is  wider  for  were relatively large. Further, consistent with
years  one to five and after year  17. Further,  intuition, the stimulus to investment increased
taxes paid under TRA now cut the Samuelson  as taxable income increased.
tax  liability  in  year  15  instead  of year  14.  In aggregate, the change in tax law in 1986
Hence,  the  distortionary  effect  is  probably  reduced the significance  of tax considerations
more sensitive to changes in the discount rate  in the investment  decision. Furthermore,  the
as income increases.  reduction in distortion increased as income in-
creased.  Unfortunately,  the  majority  of the
CONCLUSIONS  decrease  in distortion  for high-income  house-
This study investigated  the  change  in dis-  holds resulted  from the reduction  in average
tortionary  effects  on  capital  investments  tax rates. However,  the reduction  of tax dis-
between the 1982 TEFRA and the 1986 TRA.  tortion  due  to changes  in  depreciation and
The  analysis  focused  on  the  investment  other tax preferences  was also significant for
decision  for  an  acre  of  oranges  in  southern  all income levels.
Florida. The study found that the  distortion-
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114APPENDIX  1
Equation (1) in the text can be reexpressed as a difference equation to facilitate the remain-
der of the proof. Using Goldberg's  definition, the first difference of equation (1) from the text is
(A. 1) AVt (T)  =  Vt + (T)  - Vt(T)
NA  .T(N.-D.)  nj Nj-T(Nj-Dj)
AVt(T)  =  I 
j=t+l  n  (  +ik(1-T))  j=t  (1+ ik (1- T))
k=t+l  k=t
N t -T(Nj-Dj)  1
=  V+  (T ) - Vt+  (T)  - (1 + ik (1-  T))  (1 + it (1- T))
E  Nj-T(Nj-Dj)
J
j=t+l  n  (l+ik(1-T))
k=t+l
Nt -T(Nj-Dj)  Vt+ (T)
Vt+, (  (1  + ik (1-  T))  (1 + it (1- T))
(A.2) Vt+, (T)  =  (1 + it(1- T))AVt(T)+  Nt -T(N t -Dt).
it(l-T)
APPENDIX 2
Using a form of A.2, the difference of the present value of the investment becomes
(A.3)  AV (T)  - it (1-  T)Vt+ (T) - Nt + T(N t -Dt)
(1 + it (1 -T))
If the marginal tax rate is zero, this becomes
(A.4) AVt(0)  =  itVt+l()  -Nt
(  + it)
Recognizing  that if the  sequence  of depreciation  is  chosen  so that  the economic  value  of the
investment is invariant to the marginal tax rate, then AVt+  (T) = AV t+  (0) and Vt (T) = Vt (0) = Vt.
To derive the sequence of depreciation, solve for {D t }t=1  such that
(A. 5)  AVt+  (T)  =  AVt+ 1(0)
(it (1 -T)Vt+1 -Nt + T(Nt -Dt ))  _  (itVt+  -Nt )
(l + it (1 -T))  ( l+i t )
N  -D t =  [itNt + itt+ 1]
(l+it)
D  =  [itVt+l +itN t]
(l+i t )
or just as Samuelson's theorem states
(A.6) DT  = -AV t(O).
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